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THE STATES, THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
AND THE WAR. PROTESTERS
"Hell nol We won't go!" respond crowds of draft-age youths to the
exhortations of a Stokley Carmichael or an H. Rap Brown.' Benjamin
Spock, Martin Luther King, Linus Pauling, Bishops Pike and Sheen,
and other religious and moral leaders raise their voices in objection to
American participation in the Vietnam conflict.2 Most of these leaders
discourage enlisting in the armed forces while the United States is en-
gaged in a war they regard as immoral. Many actively encourage youths
to register as conscientious objectors or to take other lawful steps to
avoid military service. Some advocate avoidance of service by any means,
legal or illegal.
"Counseling centers" have been established to assist individual ob-
jectors in avoiding military service.3 Many counselors use "nondirec-
tive" counseling methods, pointing out the alternatives available to the
objector, and leaving to him the decision of which method to choose,
whereas others, more inclined toward "directive" counseling, advocate
such positive action as fleeing to Canada, feigning medical defects or
emotional aberrations, securing criminal convictions, or simply refusing
to be inducted.4 The unpopularity of the Vietnam conflict has also re-
sulted in mass demonstrations, 5 picketing of draft boards, induction
centers, and recruiting offices,6 and actual physical interference with the
operation of these facilities.7
I N.Y. Times, May 2, 1967, at 7, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1966, at 16, col. 7; N.Y.
Times, Oct. 30, 1966, § 1, at 63, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1966, at 1, col. 7.
2 See, e.g., Reeves, Peace, Man, Says Baby Doctor Spock, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1967, §
6 (Magazine), at 8-9; Conversion: Bishop Sheen's Call for Unilateral Withdrawal, NEws-
WEEK, Aug. 14, 1967, at 90; Doctor King's Crusade: How He Hopes To End the War, U.S.
NEws, May 8, 1967, at 14; N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1967, at 13, col. 1; N.Y. Times, July 18,
1967, at 27, col. 3; N.Y. Times, July 2, 1967, § 1, at 2, col. 5; N.Y. Times, May 6, 1967, at 1,
col. 6; N.Y. Times, May 1, 1967, at 1, col. 7; N.Y. Times, April 5, 1967, at 1, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, April 2, 1967, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
3 Draft Counseling and Resistance Centers, TIME, Sept. 8, 1967, at 15; see, e.g., N.Y.
Times, July 18, 1967, at 27, col. 3; N.Y. Times, July 2, 1967, § 1, at 2, col. 5.
4 See, e.g., Jackson, Evading the Draft: Who, How and Why, Lirz, Dec. 9, 1966, at 40;
Resistance Movement, NEw REPuinLIC, May 24, 1967, at 5; N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1967, at 5,
col. 3; N.Y. Times, July 18, 1967, at 27, col. 3.
t See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1967, at 1, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1967, at 1, coL 5;
id. at 8, col. 1.
6 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1967, at 1, col. 4; id. at 8; col. 4; N.Y. Times, Oct. 28,
1967, at 5, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1967, at 1, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1967, 'at 3,
col. 7.
7 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1967, at 1, col. 4 (picketing and resistance at New York
City induction center); N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1967, at 5, col. 3 (blood poured in draft files);
id. at 5, col. 6 (protest at Oberlin against Naval recruiters); N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1967, at 9,
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WAR PROTESTERS
The protestors run the risk of violating federal and state statutes
prohibiting acts that interfere with drafting or recruiting members of
the armed forces.8 Construed broadly, either the federal recruitment
obstruction statute9 or the federal sedition statute10 could render all
their activities criminal. Various state statutes also make it a crime to
publicly" or privately 2 discourage enlisting in the armed forces or to
use "scurrilous" or "abusive" speech regarding the government or the
military13
The application of both federal and state statutes raises serious
constitutional issues. A broad interpretation of the federal sedition stat-
ute may clash with the first amendment protection of free speech. The
validity of the state statutes, leftovers of wartime sedition acts,' 4 is espe-
cially questionable under free speech principles, because they lack the
careful draftsmanship of the federal provisions. Unlike the federal stat-
utes, they cannot be justified in terms of self-preservation and national
interest. Furthermore, they are subject to attack on the grounds of
vagueness and federal preemption.
I
FEDERAL CRIMES
A. The Federal Sedition Statute
Unlike its predecessor, the broad Espionage Act of 1917,r the pres-
col. 3 (protest at Oakland induction center); N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1967, at 16, col. 1 (protest
at Oakland induction center).
8 E.g., Act of June 25, 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a) (1964); Universal Military Training
and Service Act § 12(a), 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix § 462(a) (Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53-5 (1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.395 (1964); MONT. Rxv. CODES ANN. § 94-4401
(1947); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:148-22 (1953).
9 Universal Military Training and Service Act § 12(a), 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix § 462(a)
(Supp. 1967).
10 Act of June 25, 1948, 18 U.S.C. .§ 2388(a) (1964).
11 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:148-22 (1953). Although this statute purports to apply only to
public speech, it also encompasses all printed matter of similar content.
12 MONT. Rxv. CODE ANN.. § 94-4401 (1947).
13 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-5 (1958); MONT. R-v. CODES ANN. § 94-4401 (1947).
14 E.g., Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 99 3-4, 40 Stat. 219, as amended, Act of May 16,
1918, ch. 75, §§ 3-4, 40 Stat. 553-54. (Most of these state statutes were first enacted during
World War I.) See generally Hervey & Kelley, Some Constitutional Aspects of Statutory
Regulation of Libels on Government, 15 TEMP. L.Q. 453 (1941). See also Z. C-IAFEn, FREE-
voM oF SPmCH 44-45 (1920).
15 Ch. 30, §§ 3-4, 40 Stat. 219, as amended, Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, §§ 34, 40 Stat.
553-54. Section 3 of the 1918 amendment provided in part:
[W]hoever, wheir the United States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to
cause,. or incite or- attempt to-incite, insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or re-
fusal of duty, in the military or naval forcesiof the United States, or shall willfully
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ent federal sedition statute16 prohibits only actual or attempted obstruc-
tion of enlistments. Although the statute purports to be operative only
"when the United States is at war,"'17 in 1953 Congress extended its ef-
fect until six months. after the President declared an end to the "na-
tional emergency" that had been proclaimed it the beginning of the
Korean conflict.' 8 No president has officially declared an end to that
emergency, and the statute is presently in full effect.19 Under the act,
any person who "willfully obstructs the recruiting or enlistment service
of the United States" is guilty of a crime.2 0
Although the statute appears unambiguous on its face, the meaning
of its essential terms is uncertain. "Obstructs" may be narrowly con-
strued to include only actual physical interference with recruitment
services, or it may be read broadly to include any psychological interfer-
ence, including speech that might discourage persons from enlisting or
serving in the armed forces.21 The definition of "recruiting or enlist-
ment service" is equally ambiguous. It may relate only to an actual re-
cruiting situation, such as a recruiting campaign on a college campus,
or, construed broadly, may include the government's overall recruit-
ment program.
The construction given the statute is vitally important in determin-
obstruct or attempt to obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United
States, and whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully utter, print,
write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the
form of government of the United States.... or the uniform of the Army or Navy
of the United States,... or shall willfully utter, print, write, or publish any lan-
guage intended to incite, provoke, or encourage resistance to the United States...
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not
more than twenty years, or both.
The ridiculous extremes to which prosecutions under this statute were carried are recorded
in Z. CHAFEE, supra note 14, at 40-119.
16 Act of June 25, 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a) (1964).
17 Id.
18 Act of June 30, 1953, 18 U.S.C. § 2391 (1964).
19 Letter from Representative Emmanuel Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee, to the Cornell Law Review, Oct. 24, 1967, on file in the Cornell Law Library.
In this letter Chairman Celler reported that the Department of Justice confirmed that
18 U.S.C. § 2391 is operative. The operation of this statute is contingent on President Tru-
man's proclamation at the beginning of the Korean War. Pr6c. No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 1949-53
Comp. 99 (1950), 50 U.S.C. Appendix at 9497 (1964).
20 Act of June 25, 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a) (1964).
21 Apparently the word "obstructs" has been broadly construed under similar provi-
sions to include speech made in nonrecruitment situations. See Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919) (socialist's public speech against World War I); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919) (newspaper publisher's printed opposition to World War I); O'Hare v.
United States, 253 F. 538 (8th Cir. 1918), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 598 (1919) (socialist lec-
turer's statements opposing World War I).
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ing the constitutional validity of the prohibitions imposed. 2 The fur-
ther an interpretation strays from physical interference with an actual
recruitment situation, the more likely the prohibitions will violate the
free speech guarantee.23
B. Section 12(a) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act-
Counseling Evasion of Service
Section 12(a) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act24
provides that a person "who knowingly counsels, aids, or abets another
to refuse or evade registration or service in the armed forces" is guilty
of a crime.25 The elements of the crime include intent26 to counsel, aid,
or abet avoidance of registration or service. "Aid" and "abet" are famil-
iar terms in criminal law and do not present unusual problems of inter-
pretation. The definition of "counsel," however, is not so clear. It
may connote either advice and instruction through the passive inter-
change of ideas, or advice and instruction with a deliberate intent to in-
fluence behavior.27 The former suggests nondirective counseling; the
latter connotes directive counseling.
Directive counseling to avoid military service by illegal means falls
squarely within the statutory prohibition under any possible interpre-
tation of the word "counsel." Nondirective counseling that results in il-
legal action is not so clearly prohibited, since the word "counsel" can be
limited to the giving of affirmative advice. Furthermore, the illegal
action resulting from nondirective counseling arguably is the sole re-
sponsibility of the advisee, since he makes his own choice between the al-
ternative courses of action explained by the counselor. Directive coun-
seling is analogous to criminal conspiracy: a mutually agreed upon
22 If the federal sedition statute were interpreted to prohibit only physical interfer-
ence, then there would be no question of its validity in relation to constitutionally pro-
tected speech.
23 Thus, if the statute prohibits speech that merely discourages the public in general
from enlisting, even when uttered far from 'an actual recruiting situation, the statute prob-
ably violates the first amendment guarantee of free speech.
24 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix § 462(a) (Supp. 1967). Portions of this act (not here pertinent)
were substantially amended by the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 100.
25 62 Stat. 622, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix § 462(a) (Supp. 1967). Although this statute does
not seem to have been applied in such a manner as to violate free speech, some convictions
in themselves seem shocking. For example, the statute his ,been applied to cover advice not
to register given by a college dean, to one of his students, Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38'
(6th Cir. 1949), aff'd, 840 U.S. 857 (1950); and by a physician to his stepson. -Warren v.
United States, 177 F.2d 596 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 947 (1950).
26 The word "knowingly" implies culpable intent. Graves v. United States, 252 F.2d
878 (9th Cir. 1958).
27 WEBsrER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DicrIoNARY 518 (1961).
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course of illegal action is planned.2 8 Nondirective counseling, however,
does not involve a mutually agreed upon course of action. Often the
counselor is not even aware of the action ultimately taken by the client.
Thus, the criminal conspiracy analogy does not apply.
Just as the sedition statute is open to a variety of interpretations,
section 12(a) may be construed either narrowly to prohibit only direc-
tive counseling that encourages illegal activity, or broadly to include
even nondirective counseling or directive counseling that encourages
only lawful means of avoiding service, such as registering as a conscien-
tious objector.29 Again, the construction will significantly affect the
constitutional validity of the statute.
II
FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSES
Both the sedition statute and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act restrict a citizen's right to protest the actions of his govern-
ment whenever the means of protest interferes with raising an army.
All but the narrowest constructions of these statutes infringe the free-
dom of expression guaranteed by the first amendment. The forerunner
of the statutes, the Espionage Act of 1917,30 was upheld against a first
amendment attack in Schenck v. United States.31 Justice Holmes there
formulated the "clear and present danger" test which has become the
touchstone of modern free speech principles. During the five years fol-
lowing Schenck, Justices Holmes and Brandeis refined this test to pro-,
tect speech that did not produce a danger of immediate action.32
28 The essence of conspiracy at common law is two or more persons combining with
the intent and purpose of committing a public offense by doing an unlawful act. The ac-
tual occurrence of an act is required under the federal view. See Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203 (1961); Harney v. United States, 306 F.2d 523 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
911 (1962); Ventimiglia v. United States, 242 F.2d 620 (4th Cir. 1957).
29 It seems fairly certain that the section -prohibits only -the counseling of illegal
means to avoid service. Cf. Weaver v. Pool, 249 Ala..644, 647-48, 32 So. 2d 765, 767-68 (1947)
(dictum). See also Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 134, 136 (1966).
80 Ch. 30, §§ 3-4, 40 Stat. 219, as amended, Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, §§ -4, 40 Stat.
553-54.
31 249 U.S. 47 (1919). In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951), Justice Vin-
son refers to Schenck as the first important case to deal with free speech.,
32 See the minority opinions of Justices Brandeis and Holmes in Abrams v. United:
States, -250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919), Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920), Pierce
v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253 (1920), Gitlow v. New York,.268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925), and
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 857, 872 (1927). In Gitlow;v; New York, supra at 673, Jus-
tices Holmes and Brandeis indicated that only speech which "attempt[s] to induce an up-
rising against government at once and not at some indefinite time in the future" can
legitimately be punished within the confines of the first and, fourteenth amendments.
[Vol. 53:528
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The extent to which the right to protest is protected today is illus-
trated by the statement of the Supreme Court, in New York-Times-v.
Sullivan33 that speech dealing with public issues "should be uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open, and ... it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials."'34 The Court concluded, therefore, that the Sedition
Act of 1798,35 which prohibited vocalized opposition to government
policies, has been declared unconstitutional in the court of history.36 In
Bond v. Floyd,37 the Court announced that "the First Amendment pro-
tects -expressions in opposition to national foreign policy in Vietnam
and to the Selective Service system." 38
It is clear, therefore, that not all speech that may interfere with re-
cruiting or the draft can be prohibited. It is equally dear, however, that
not all such speech is protected. In Bond, the Court suggested a'distinc-
tion of prime importance in defining the permissible scope of dissent-
the distinction between speech urging lawful activity and speech urging
unlawful activity.3 9 Thus, public or private speech urging lawful dissent
or avoidance of service through legal means should be privileged re-
gardless of its popularity or success,40 since there is no legitimate gov-
8 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The right of free speech today has probably advanced beyond
the views of Justices Holmes and Brandeis. In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951),
the Court upheld the conviction of Communist Party members under the Smith Act, 18
U.S.C. § 2385 (1964), which dealt with teaching or advocating the overthrow of the govern-
ment. This view was subsequently rejected. The majority in Dennis expanded the concept
of imminent action to encompass events distant in time and remote in danger. The dis-
senters contended that the majority misapplied Holmes's test. 341 U.S. at 581-90. Recently,
Justices Clark and Harlan, dissenting in two separate cases; protested that Dennis was
ignored and that the area of free speech was becoming overly broad. Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 623 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 500 (1965).
34 376 U.S. at 270. New York Times is generally regarded as broadening protection
under the first amendment. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Cen-
tral Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191.
35 Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596.
386 376 U.S. at 276 (dictum). This reasoning may have some bearing on the constitu-
tionality of the federal sedition statute and the Smith Act. The Smith Act has been re-
ferred to as the first peacetime sedition act since 1798. Ballard, Freedom of Speech Today,
48 A.BA.J. 521, 522 (1962). -
37 385 U.S. 116 (1966). In this -case the Court -ruled unconstitutional. the exclusion of
Julian Bond from the* Georgia House. of Represe.ntatives for expressing opposition io the
war in Vietnam. --
38 d.'at 132. ". - -
89 Id. at 134, 136. It is interesting to note that the Court in Bond dted-New York
Times as the sole'free speech authority. I I
40 Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (arrest not justified by mere peaceful ex-
pression of unpopular opinion); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (peaceful
expression of minority views may call for police protection, rather than arrest).
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ernmental interest in preventing a person from exercising his legal
rights. Speech urging illegal action, however, cannot always be pro-
tected. Here a distinction must be drawn between public speech and
private counseling.
Whether public speech urging illegal action can be prohibited de-
pends on a balancing of the rights of the individual against the interests
of the government. 41 The federal government undoubtedly has a right
of self-preservation, and Congress has the right to "raise and support
Armies,"' 3 but the exercise of these rights may not unnecessarily in-
fringe the rights of the individual. Since the government has an interest
in its own orderly functioning, it may, in some circumstances, prohibit
public speech that is likely to cause direct and immediate disobedience
of its laws.44 A speech made to an angry crowd of youths in front of a lo-
cal draft board office urging them to loot and burn the office, or to a
similar crowd before a recruiting office urging them to physically attack
the recruiters, threatens interests that the government has a right to
protect and creates the possibility of direct and immediate action. Thus,
it is outside the area of constitutionally protected speech. In the rela-
tively sedate atmosphere of a church or college auditorium, on the other
hand, public speech criticizing American participation in the Vietnam
conflict as morally wrong and stating that no one should be willing to
serve in such a war does not usually create the possibility of direct and
immediate dangerous action, even though it may result in some youths
ultimately resorting to illegal means of avoiding service.
The Court has always been more concerned with protecting public,
as opposed to private, speech, since public speech tends to preserve
freedom, inform the public, and encourage legitimate change.45 Thus,
whereas the Constitution may protect a public speaker urging all youths
to flee to Canada, it may not protect a private counselor who urges an
individual to flee to Canada. Indeed, privately advocating illegal action
41 Such a test has always been used whether it has been called a "clear and present
danger" test or a "balancing" test. Compare Alfange, The Balancing of Interests Test in
Free Speech Cases: In Defense of an Abused Doctrine, 2 L. IN Tm~s. Q. 35 (1965), with Z.
Cw nA., supra note 14, at 38. Alfange suggests that the decision in Dennis was a disaster
"not because the Court balanced interests, but because it did not." Alfange, supra at 48.
42 See generally Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951); Hartzel v. United
States, 322 U.S. 680, 689 (1944); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). But cf.
Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49 CALIF. L.
REv. 4 (1961).
43 U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8; see Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 330-31 (1920).
44 See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 134 (1966) (dictum).
45 See id. at 136; New York Times v. Sullivan; 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964); Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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such as refusal of induction may constitute criminal conspiracy,46 and
can be prohibited.
Since the federal sedition statute can be construed broadly to in-
clude acts that are clearly protected by the first amendment, it is subject
to attack as unconstitutional on its face. But the Supreme Court proba-
bly will never take this route. As ultimate arbiter of federal statutes, it
can construe the statutes narrowly, including within the prohibition
only those acts that Congress has the power to prohibit. Thus, free
speech can be protected without sacrificing the ability to punish truly
unlawful acts. 47
III
STATE CRIMES
Although state statutes vary widely, for purposes of analysis two
general categories are discernible: "scurrilous speech" statutes, 48 and
"enlistment obstruction" statutes.49 The elements of the crime under
each are significantly different.
A. "Scurrilous Speech" Statutes
The "scurrilous speech" statutes are exemplified by the Connecti-
cut statute, which provides:
Any person who speaks, or writes, prints and publicly exhibits
or distributes, or who publicly exhibits, posts or advertises any dis-
loyal, scurrilous or abusive matter concerning the form of govern-
ment of the United States, its military forces, flag or uniforms, or
any matter which is intended to bring them into contempt or which
creates or fosters opposition to organized government, shall be fined
not more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than
five years or both.50
These statutes are similar to the Espionage Act of 1917,51 which was se-
verely criticized as too broad. 52 A broad construction of the Connecti-
46 See pp. 531-32 9- note 28 supra.
47 The Supreme Court construes statutes in such a way as t6"findjf at all possible,
that they prohibit conduct only in constitutionally permissible areas. See, e.g., Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
48 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-5 (1958); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-4401 (1947).
49 E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.395 (1964); MONT. RIv. CODES ANN. § 94-4401 (1947);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:148-22 (1953).
50 CONN. Gmu. STAT. ANN. § 53-5 (1958).
51 Ch. 30, §§ 3-4, 40 Stat. 219, as amended, Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, §§ 3-4, 40 Stat.
553-54. See Z. CHvAFE, supra note 14, at 40-119.
52 For a discussion of broad federal statutes applied during times of war or national
emergency, see Boudin, "Seditious Doctrines" and the "Clear and Present Danger Rule,"
38 VA. L. REY. 143 (1952); Hervey & Kelley, supra note 14, at 47Q-92; O'Brian, Restraints
upon Individual Freedom in Times of Emergency, 26 CoRNELL L.Q. 523, 526 (1941).
1968]
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cut statute might subject to criminal prosecution a person who advo-
cates a constitutional amendment or criticizes a military uniform for
aesthetic-reasons. It d6uId be apiplied to a public speaker who criticizes
American foreign policy or the Selective Service system. Indeed, the
statutes are commonly so vague that they could be used to prohibit any
speech that in any way criticizes the 'government, its agencies, or its
symbols. Nor do they seem limited to public speech, but rather appear
applicable to the private words of a draft counselor who condemns the
military forces by stating, for example, that he believes the American
participation in Vietnam is illegal and the soldiers fighting there are
guilty of war crimes.
B. Enlistment Obstruction Statutes
The New Jersey sedition statute53 is typical of "enlistment ob-
struction" statutes. It provides that any person who advocates, prints,
or publishes, "in any public place or at any meeting where more than 5
persons are assembled, that any person should not enlist in any of the
armed forces of the United States or of this state . . . is guilty of a high
misdemeanor."'5 4 Some statutes deal only with public speech,55 but others
apparently cover both public and private speech5" and thus reach both
public advocacy and private counseling. Although not all of these stat-
utes expressly require intent, the courts have inferred an intent require-
ment.5 7
The statutes pose an important problem of construction concerning
the content and surrounding circumstances that might bring speech
within the prohibition. Read narrowly, the prohibition includes only
speech that specifically urges others not to enlist. Read broadly, the pro-
hibition might include any dissenting opinion concerning military or
foreign policy, since such statements might be intended to discourage
others from enlisting.58 Either reading raises a number of vital consti-
tutional issues.
53 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:148-22 (1953).
54 Id. A high misdemeanor is punishable by a maximum imprisonment of seven years.
Id. § 2A:85-6.
55 E.g., id. § 2A:148-22.
56 E.g., MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-4401 (1947); see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.395 (1964)
(the comments give the former sections and indicate the scope of the present law).
57 See State v. Smith, 57 Mont. 349, 188 P. 644 (1920); State v. Wyman, 56 Mont. 600,
186 P. 1 (1919); State v. DeFillipis, 15 NJ. Super. 7, 83 A.2d 16 (1951). But see State v. Gil-
bert, 141 Minn. 263, 169 N.W. 790 (1918), aff'd, 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
58 The words spoken in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920), were little more
than criticism of the government. In Gilbert "the'Supreme Court upheld the defendant's
convictfin Undera *broad sture provision making it a crime to discourage enlistments. For
[Vol. 53:528
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IV
CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSES TO STATE PROSECUTION
A. First Amendment
Since the state laws are directed at the same activity as are the
federal laws, the arguments concerning restraints on freedom of ex-
pression apply to both.59 In the absence of a clear and present dan-
ger of immediate action resulting from speech, no restraint should
stand.0 The breadth of the state laws makes them appear unconstitu-
tional on their face. Unlike federal statutes, the Supreme Court is not
able to "save" these laws through interpretation, since statutory con-
struction is the final responsibility of the state's highest tribunal.61 Fur-
thermore, as is apparent from even a cursory comparative reading, the
state statutes lack the careful draftsmanship of the federal laws. Finally,
the arguments of self-preservation and national defense that may be
made in justification of the federal statutes are inapplicable to the state
statutes.
In Gilbert v. Minnesota,6 2 a state statute8 similar to the New Jer-
sey law6" was upheld, over constitutional objections based on the first
and fourteenth amendments, as an appropriate exercise of the state po-
lice power. The dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis, which is more
in accord with modern constitutional law than is the majority opinion,
noted that the statute could be applied where there was no imminent
danger and that it therefore threatened constitutionally protected
speech. 5 In order legitimately to restrain speech today a statute must be
drafted to apply only to the narrow area of speech that the state may
prohibit. 6 The majority opinion in Gilbert, therefore, is no longer an
acceptable view.
examples of the punishment of mere criticism under similar statutes, see Z. CHAEE, supra
note 14, at 40-119.
59 See pp. 532-34 & notes 50-45 supra.
60 See cases cited note 32 supra.
61 The highest state tribunal gives a state statute its final interpretation and the Uni-
ted States Supreme Court makes its decision in light of this interpretation. At times, a
state statute will be so vague or so clearly in conflict with constitutional rights that the
Supreme Court may find it unconstitutional lacking final state court construction. See, e.g.,
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
62 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
63 Law of April 20, 1917, ch. 463, [1917] Minn. Laws (repealed 1963); see MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.395 (1964).
64 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:148-22 (1953).
65 254 U.S. at 334-35...... .
66 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
860 (.1964); XThornhill. v. Alibama, 310.T.S.88.(1940);. Stromberg v. California, 283 .Us. 359
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B. Vagueness and Due Process
Penal statutes lacking clear definitions of the prohibited activity
are subject to attack as void for vagueness. 67 One is not constitutionally
"required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
meaning of penal statutes.1 68 What is scurrilous or abusive speech?
What words tend to bring the government or its symbols into con-
tempt? What speech discourages persons from enlisting? Opponents of
the Vietnam conflict must engage in a guessing game in order to decide
what protests might make them subject to criminal sanction. Such a
guessing game is questionable in any case; when the prohibited activity
is ordinarily protected by the first amendment, the game cannot be tol-
erated.69
C. Preemption
The Constitution allocates legislative authority between the state
and federal governments in four ways: (1) areas of exclusive state or fed-
eral concern where only one sovereign is permitted to legislate;70 (2)
areas of federal concern where the states are permitted to apply their
own legislation until Congress occupies the field;71 (3) areas of combined
federal and state interest where federal and state legislation are per-
mitted to coexist;72 and (4) areas of combined federal and state interest
where the federal interests outweigh any state interests.73
(1931). Statutes proscribing illegal speech cannot constitutionally encompass "other activi-
ties that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or of the
press." Thornhill v. Alabama, supra at 97. In Stromberg v. California the Court struck
down a "seditious flag" statute because it could "be construed to include peaceful and or-
derly opposition to government by legal means and within constitutional limits." 283 U.S.
at 366, quoting People v. Mintz, 106 Cal. App. 725, 734, 290 P. 93, 97 (1930) (dissenting
opinion).
67 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); DeGregory v. Attorney
General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Stromberg v. Califor-
nia, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
68 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
9 See cases cited note 67 supra.
70 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (exclusive federal power over foreign
relations); Strand v. Schmittroth, 251 F.2d 590 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 886 (1957)
(limitation on power of federal courts).
71 See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (sedition); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (interstate rate regulation).
72 See Florida Lime & Avacado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, rehearing denied,
374 U.S. 858 (1963) (retail marketing laws); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949) (regula-
tion of transportation).
73 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 US. 225, rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 973
WAR PROTESTERS
Both dissenting opinions in Gilbert v. Minnesota4 contended that
the Federal Espionage Act of 191775 had preempted the field, leaving
no room for the individual states to enact similar legislation. Justice
Brandeis felt that the regulation of speech and conduct that interfered
with federal recruitment services and the federal war effort was an area
of solely federal concern and that state legislation in the area was not
permissible. He stated that "Congress has the exclusive power to legis-
late concerning the Army and the Navy of the United States, and to de-
termine, among other things, the conditions of enlistment."76 Justice
Brandeis argued further that even if this were not an area of solely fed-
eral concern, the Espionage Act of 1917, providing a complete plan of
federal legislation in the area, would have preempted the field.7
The trend of federal constitutional law has supported the pre-
emption views of Justice Brandeis.78 In modem times the Court held,
in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,79 that the Pennsylvania Sedition Act, deal-
ing with subversive activities controls, was preempted by the Smith
Act.80 In Nelson the Court formulated a three-fold test for determining
whether an area has been preempted by Congress. First, is "the scheme
of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the infer-
ence that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it"".? Sec-
ond, is the "federal interest ... so dominant that the federal system
[must] be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject"8 2? And third, does the "enforcement of state.., acts [present]
... a serious danger of conflict with the administration of the federal
program"83 ?
On the basis of this test, it appears that state sedition laws deal-
ing with enlistments fall directly within a preempted area. Inter-
(1964) (federal patent law over any state law); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp.
Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963) (federal pipeline regulation over state laws).
74 254 U.S. 525, 354 (1920).
75 Ch. 30, §§ 5-4, 40 Stat. 219, as amended, Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, §§ 3-4, 40 Stat.
553-54.
76 254 U.S. at 336.
77 Id. at 334-36.
78 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 US. 52 (1941).
79 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
80 Compare 18 US.C. § 2385 (1964) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4207 (1963). This de-
cision stirred Congressional concern over the Court's views of preemption. See Hearings on
H.R. 3 Before Subcdmm. No. I of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 9 (1955); Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction,
12 STAN. L. Rlv. 208 (1959).
81 350 US. at 502, quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947).
82 Id. at 504, quoting 331 U.S. at 230.
83 Id. at 505.
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fering with recruitments is a crime against the federal government,
and the federal scheme, limited to times of imminent danger and more
carefully drawn to protect personal liberties, 4 leaves no room for an in-
ference that Congress intended the states to supplement it. Further-
more, the Constitution does not provide for concurrent state power to
prevent the obstruction of federal armed forces, but rather makes this a
solely federal concern.8 5 National security and preservation of the
armed forces have been treated as matters of vital national interest.8 6
The only possible state interest in the matter must relate to the state po-
lice power.87 Finally, state enforcement of such statutes results in spo-
radic local prosecutions and a multiplicity of tribunals producing in-
compatible standards.
Since state laws prohibiting seditious words invade an area already
covered by federal provisions,88 and since Such statutes overlap the fed-
eral sedition statute, they also seem to be preempted. State power to
punish such overlapping offenses as impersonation of federal officers,
desecration of the flag, and the like, probably is also preempted, except
where there is a local breach of the peace.89 As pointed out by the ma-
jority in Gilbert, the real purpose of such state legislation is to aid the
federal government in maintaining respect for federal institutionsY0
Once the federal government has acted in these areas, however, any
state legislation not directly related to state police power is probably
impermissible.
D. Police Power
Because of the presence of federal legislation, the only remaining
matter of legitimate state concern is public safety at the local level. The
decision in Gilbert, upholding a state sedition law, was later limited in
this fashion by the Nelson Court.91
The danger of a breach of peace is obvious when one yells profani-
ties as the American flag passes in a parade or uses abusive language in
reference to the Marine uniform in a bar full of Marines. Application
of the state laws under such circumstances might be justified in terms of
84 See id. at 507-09.
85 'See id. at 501; U.S. CONSr. art. T,*§ 8.
86 See Pennsylvania v. Nelson; 350 U.S. 497, 505 (1956). .
'87 See id. at 505-09. •
88 Act of June 25, 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a) (1964).
89 Cramton, The Supreme Court and State Power To Deal with Subversion and Loy-
alty, 43 MINN. L. Rkv. 1025, 1033 (1959).)But cf. Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S.72 (1959).
90 Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 328-31 (1920).
91 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 501 (1956).
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the Court's "fighting words" doctrine.92 These cases, however, are better
resolved under breach of the peace statutes, which do not prohibit con-
stitutionally protected speech encouraging persons not to enlist.93 Re-
ferring to the argument that words may produce a breach of the peace,
the Court has differentiated between incitement and reaction.94 Speech
that urges persons to illegal action may be punishable under the state's
police power to prevent disorderly conduct and destruction of life and
property, if the possibility of such immediate substantive evils exists.
But unpopular speech that produces hostile reaction among the listen-
ers must be given protection as long as the speech itself is not intention-
ally used to produce hostilities and is given at some proper forum. In
response to the contention that unpopular public expressions tend to
produce a disturbance of the peace, the Court has stated that "constitu-
tional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their as-
sertion or exercise."95 Of course, there are limits to what one can say in
producing hostilities, as illustrated by the "fighting words" doctrine.
For example, personally abusive remarks to a soldier concerning his
uniform may be outside first amendment protection. Similarly, one who
harasses a zealous enlistee concerning the morality of his enlistment
may overstep the bounds of free speech. But public speech in a proper
forum, concerning all military uniforms or encouraging the public in
general not to enlist should be protected by the first amendment.
CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of state and federal statutes dealing with ob-
structing federal recruitment, counseling the evasion of service, dis-
couraging persons from enlisting in the armed forces, and speaking
scurrilously against the government or its symbols depends, at least to
some degree, on the construction given them by the courts. The federal
sedition statute, if interpreted narrowly to encompass only physical in-
terference with an actual recruitment situation, presents no serious
92 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 US. 250 (1952). Contra, Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
Apparently this doctrine, that words which produce hostility may be punished, could have
been limited to the area of direct personal insult before Beauharnais. Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
93 Most states have breach of the peace statutes, statutes enabling municipalities to
pass breach of the peace ordinances, or more specific statutes dealing with inciting riots,
trespasses on public property, and similar breaches of the peace.
94 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 US. 1 (1949);
Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
95 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 US. 536, 551 (1965), quoting Watson v. Memphis, 373 US.
526, 535 (1962).
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question of constitutionality. If interpreted to encompass speech aimed
at preventing enlistments in an actual recruitment situation, the statute
might be upheld as a legitimate attempt to prevent disturbances on fed-
eral premises. Any broader application of the statute would be an un-
constitutional invasion of free speech.
Section 12(a) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act,
which deals with counseling, aiding, or abetting persons in the evasion
of registration or service, is probably constitutional as presently con-
strued, since it apparently punishes only the counseling of illegal action.
The present state sedition and scurrilous speech statutes appear
unconstitutional on first amendment, vagueness, and preemption
grounds. They do not lend themselves readily to any constitutional con-
struction. Conceivably, an extremely narrow state statute dealing with
discouraging enlistments could be drafted to avoid constitutional at-
tack. Even the present Minnesota statute, which avoids the preemption
question and limits its application to a war situation, may be questioned
on first amendment grounds. A state statute, to be clearly constitu-
tional, must be limited to situations in which the police power of the
state is applicable. Since such a statute would necessarily be confined to
narrow areas already covered by breach of the peace statutes, it would
be redundant and unnecessary.
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